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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
capitalized incorporated enterprise or other abuse of the privilege of
achieving limited liability by incorporation."
The equitable criteria has been an adequate test for the existence or
non-existence of the corporate entity in any conceivable combination of
rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, it seems illogical that the
court would feel the need of establishing a rule of automatic invalidity.
Because of this implication, however, it is clear that the Terrace case will
have a disturbing impact on the law of this area until a judicial or legis-
lative remedy is presented.
FRANKLiN A. SNYDER.
Criminal Law-Entrapment in North Carolina
It has been said' that the first reported instance of a defense of en-
trapment is to be found in the decision by the Great Lawgiver, overruling
that ancient plea tendered by Eve in Paradise, "The serpent beguiled me
and I did eat.' 2
The earliest reported pleas in North Carolina of temptation by others,
appear in the cases of Dodd v. Hamilton3 and State v. Jernagan4 in
1817, and since that time the defense has often been interposed in the
North Carolina courts. Perhaps the most enlightening approach to a
presentation of the position of the North Carolina court on the doctrine
of entrapment is an examination of the cases against a background of
the subject generally.
The classic, and most frequently cited definition of entrapment is that
of Mr. Justice Roberts, in Sorrells v. United States.5 "Entrapment is
the conception and planning of an offense by an officer and his procure-
ment of its commission by one who would not have done so except for
the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer."0
The basis for the doctrine of entrapment seems to be ethical rather
than legal considerations.7 The judicial approach to the problem does
not lay stress upon any feeling of solicitude for the accused or try to
strike a balance between the equities of the government and those of the
accused. Rather, it seems to stem from a realization by the courts that
the law is mechanistic in that it does not consider the ability of the of-
fender to resist temptation. As Professor Sayre declared: "Historically,
our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the
vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between
'Bernstein, In Re Eve. 65 N. J. L. J. 273 (1942).2 Genesis 3:13.
24 N. C. 31 (1817).
'4 N. C. 44 (1817).
287 U. S. 435 (1932).Id. at 440.
'Anderson, Some Aspects of Entrapment, 13 BROoKLYN L. RLv. 187, 188
(1942) ; Note, 2 So. CALIn. L. REv. 283 (1929).
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doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong." S Thus
the dictates of justice oppose conviction or punishment where the guilty
intention is synthetically created by the government for the purpose of
obtaining a conviction. The authorities agree that the true foundation
of the doctrine is public policy.9 However, the courts, by traditional
modes of thinking, have attempted to place the doctrine in the category
of a recognized principle of law, with a resulting diversity of theories as
to why it excuses the criminal act.10 These theories lend little assistance
in determining the applicability of the doctrine in a given situation.
Under the federal view of entrapment, as defined in the Sorrells case
and subsequent cases, the defense consists of two elements: (1) the
origin of the criminal intent in the mind of the officer and (2) the in-
ducement of the defendant by the officer." These elements are closely
related. The fact that no inducement was used by the officer is evidence
that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the defendant, and the
fact that such inducement was used is evidence that the criminal intent
originated in the mind of the officer.' 2 The scope of the activities by law
enforcement officers which will constitute inducement, seems to vary
with different crimes.' 3 The distinction which is drawn by the courts
in determining what constitutes improper conduct by the law officer is
that between furnishing inducement and furnishing opportunity. The
fact that the officer merely furnished the defendant an opportunity to
commit the crime;14 that is, did nothing to overcome the defendant's
shrinking reluctance,' 5 resorted to normal coaxing of a liquor pur-
chaser,'0 displayed the common symptoms of a drug addict,' 7 or sub-
'SAYEm, INTRODUcTION TO CASES ON CRImINAL LAW. (2 ed. 1937).
' Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 (1932); People v. Barkoll, 36 Cal.
App. 25, 171 Pac. 440 (1918) ; Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 187 S. E. 329(1936) ; Anderson, op. cit. supra note 7.
10 Sorrels v. United States, supra note 5 presents a marked example of this. The
majority decision held that the element vitiating criminal liability was an implied
exception in the statute creating the offense, based upon the premise that the legis-
lature intended that the statute should apply to a person acting on his own volition.
Three of the Justices, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, denied this rationale,
saying, "The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of
its own temple belongs only to the court." 287 U. S. 435, 443 (1932).
"* Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th cir. 1921) ; Peterson v. United States,
255 Fed. 433 (9th cir. 1919) ; "The doctrine is that an otherwise innocent defendant
who has been persuaded by government agents to break the law cannot be con-
victed." See Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 848 (1932).
1" Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th cir. 1924) ; "The present tendency
is to look to the conduct of the officer as the criterion to determine where the design
originated." 20 Ky. L. Rrv. 246 (1930).
" United States v. Washington, 20 F. 2d 160 (D. C. Neb.) (1927). "The scope
of activities permitted an officer differs in different crimes, due consideration being
given to the repugnancy of the offense and the difficulty of procuring evidence.";
note 28, COLUm. L. Rav. 1067 (1928) ; See also 44 HARV. L. REv. 109 (1930).
1' State v. Litosy, 52 Wash. 87, 100 Pac. 170. (1909) ; Robinson v. United States,
32 F. 2d 505 (8th Cir. 1928; note 2, So. CALIF. L. REv. 283 (1929).
15 Scriber v. United States, 4 F. 2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925).
United States v. Wray, 9 F. 2d 429. (N. D. Ga.) (1925).
1 Ibid.
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jected the defendant to no more than ordinary temptation to which he
was likely to be subjected in the discharge of his duties' 8 is not enough.
On the other hand, the defense has been held available where the officer
had resorted to pleas of desperate illness,10 or persistent coaxing, 20 or
threats,21 or any conduct of enticement, beguilment, suggestion, procure-
ment, or aiding that goes beyond the mere offering of opportunity.22 The
inquiry is confined for the most part, to the conduct of the officer.23
Some courts have made the validity of the defense of entrapment turn
upon the existence of a reasonable belief on the part of the officer that
the accused was, or was about to be, engaged in the commission of a
crime.24 Although this criterion would seem highly significant in deter-
mining the reprehensibility of the officer's conduct, it seems incorrect as
a test for entrapment. It has been pointed out 25 that, if the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the defendant, he should not be excused
because the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect him, and if the
criminal intent originated in the mind of the officer and he induced the
defendant to commit the crime, the defendant should be excused even
though the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect him. Some cases
have rejected this reasonable belief test.2 6 In Sorrells v. United States,27
however, it is held that the evidence showing reasonable suspicion, while
not serving to rebut the defense of entrapment, is admissible upon the
question of criminal intent, thus opening the door to prior offenses upon
a plea of entrapment. Some courts assert that the degree of persuasion
permitted depends upon the degree of reasonableness of the officer's
suspicion.28 Whatever the stated rule may be, the offender's predisposi-
tion to commit the same or similar offenses would seem to be an impor-
tant factor in answering the ultimate question: In whose mind did the
offense originate?
Most jurisdictions announce the same standards for determining
when the defense of entrapment is available to a defendant as the federal
courts do; that is, an inquiry into the conduct of the officer to determine
18 Scriber v. United States, sapra note 15.
10 Echols v. United States, 235 Fed. 862 (S. D. Tex.) (1918) ; United States v.
Wray, supra note 16.
0 Peterson v. United States, 255 Fed. 443 (9th Cir. 1919).
- Capuano v. United States, 9 F. 2d (1st Cir. 1925) ; United States v. Lynch, 25
6 Fed. 983. (S. D. N. Y.) (1918).
22 United States v. Washington, supra note 13.
2. Ibid.
24 Goldman v. United States, 220 Fed. 57 (6th Cir. 1915) ; United States v. Elnan
Mfg. Co., 271 Fed. 353 (D. C. Colo.) (1920); See note, 46 HARV. L. REv. 848
(1932).
20 Hitchler, Entrapment as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 42 DIcK. L. REv. 195,
201 (1937).
2' Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1924); United States v.
Washington, supra note 13.27287 U. S. 435. (1932)
28 Scriber v. United States, 4 F. 2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925).
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in whose mind the offense originated.29  Since public policy is the true
foundation of the doctrine, which is a variable quantity depending on
the magnitude of the offense, and the difficulty of detecting offenders,
among other considerations, it is not surprising that courts reach different
results while announcing the same standards. The decision in each case,
it has been said, depends on its own circumstances, 80 and "must be de-
termined by the scope of the law considered in the light of what may
fairly be demed to be its object.131
The North Carolina Supreme Court states its position as in accord
with this majority rule.3 2  The first reported case in which the defense
of entrapment by law enforcement officers was interposed, appears to be
State v. Smith.3 3 The defendant, convicted of retailing whiskey contrary
to the statute, contended that because his conviction had been obtained
from evidence obtained by police officers furnishing money and employing
one to buy it from defendant, that he. was a victim of "connivance."
There was no suggestion of inducement. The court, in rejecting the de-
fense, stated that the wrongful acts of officers will not be imputed to the
state so as to excuse the defendant from criminal liability for what he
does. .The court stated,34 "It is not the motive of the buyer, but the con-
duct of the seller which is to be considered." The court characterized the
defendant as a "live tiger," who for all his cunning, has bolted the officer's
trap and now complains that the law of the jungle has been violated.3 5
Because of the use of such meaningless generalities, North Carolina has
been cited36 as being in accord with Tennessee and New York, which re-
ject the defense altogether.3 7
Although there is language in two earlier cases indicating that the
North Carolina Supreme Court would recognize the defense in an appro-
priate case,38 it remained for State v. Love 39 to enunciate North Caro-
21 See Annots. 18 A. L. R. 146 (1922) ; 66 A. L. R. 473 (1930) ; 86 A. L. R. 263
(1933).
20 United States v. Washington, 20 F. 2d 160 (D. C. Neb.) (1927).
"1 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 440 (1932).
22 State v. Love, 229 N. C. 99, 47 S. E. 2d 712. (1948) ; State v. Jackson, 243
N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1956).
23152 N. C. 798, 67 S. E. 508 (1910).
34Id. at 800, 67 S. E. 509 (1910).
2 The defense counsel, in reply to this, contended that his client was a donkey,
not a tiger.
0 Heywood, Defense of Entrapment, 21 BAR Ass. KAN. JOURNAL 28 (1932).
" See also State v. Hopkins, 154 N. C. 622, 624, 70 S. E. 394, 394 (1911) in
which the court appeared to reject the doctrine entirely, saying:
"The methods adopted by the policeman to catch the defendant have been criti-
cized; but it must be remembered that the ways of "blockaders" are devious and
their trade is generally plied underground." However much the defendant, when
caught, may criticize the methods used to catch him, it has been held that the
transaction is, so far as defendant is concerned, a violation of the law... !'
"0 In State v. Salisbury Ice Co., 166 N. C. 366, rehearing, 166 N. C. 403 81 S.E.
737 (1914), the court, on entertaining a petition for newly discovered evidence,
recognized that there is a difference between cases in which the offender does not
19561
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lina's position on entrapment. In that case, a State Bureau of Investiga-
tion agent attempted to purchase whiskey from defendant, a person sus-
pected of liquor violations. Without further inducement, defendant sold
the officer whiskey and later was convicted on the officer's testimony. In
rejecting the defendant's plea of entrapment the court recognized that
trickery, persuasion or fraud, which induces the defendant to violate the
law, would be a valid defense, but that mere initiation, instigation, invita-
tion, or exposure to temptation by the enforcement officers is not enough,
quoting the definition of entrapment given by Mr. Justice Roberts in the
Sorrell case. The court then rendered a backhand slap at the law en-
forcement officers by saying :40
"The State questions whether the appellant's approach to this
position does not more properly challenge the wisdom and fairness
of the proceeding rather than its validity; presenting a moral
rather than a judicial problem, which, albeit debatable, must yield
to judicially approved practice ......
". considerations of the purity and fairness of the courts and
the agencies created for the administration of justice gravely chal-
lenge the propriety of a procedure wherein officers of the state
envisage, plan and instigate the commission of a crime on the
theory that a facile compliance with the officer's invitation con-
firms the accuracy of the suspicion of an unproved criminal prac-
tice, for which the defendant is in reality punished."
The court felt the contentions of the defense are judicially out voted,
though not out argued. This case is cited with approval in two recent
North Carolina cases 41 and seems to be the present North Carolina
attitude.
When it is considered that the very heart of the doctrine of entrap-
ment is public policy, a preservation of the purity and fairness of the
court's processes, it is difficult to reconcile the court's severe rebuke of
act under his own volition and those in which a trap is set to catch one contem-
plating crime, but found the defense inapplicable here because the alleged "entrap-
ment" was not by a government agent. The defendant had contended that the
victim in a false pretense prosecution was not deceived, since he bought the goods
in an effort to entrap the defendant. The court felt that the necessary element of
deception of the victim was satisfied when the "victim" exchanged his money for
the goods.
In State v. Godwin, 227 N. C. 449, 41 S. E. 2d 74 (1946), the court, in reversing
what was tantamount to a directed verdict for the State in a prosecution for illegal
sale of whiskey, observed that the prosecution's case depended upon a "broken
reed" because of the "persistent entreaty and duplicity" of the expectant purchaser,
saying that under such circumstances the defendant deserved the benefit of a reason-
able doubt as to the credibility of such witnesses.
so 229 N. C. 99, 47 S. E. 2d 712 (1948).
'OId. at 103, 47 S. E. 2d 715 (1948).
"' State v. Burnette, 242 N. C. 164, 87 S. E. 2d 191 (1955) ; State v. Jackson, 243
N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1956).
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the fairness of the methods used in this case, feeling they present a moral
rather than a judicial problem. The standards set for defining the de-
fense are products of moral considerations entirely. If the officer's con-
duct exceeded the bounds of propriety by doing more than merely offer-
ing an opportunity to one predisposed to commit crime, then the defense
is available, as the court recognizes. On the other hand, if the officer
trapped a suspected law violator by the violator's own facile compliance,
unaided by abnormal temptation, it is difficult to see legal or ethical
objections unless it is felt that law officers should be hard working and
intelligent, but not clever.42
The defense as defined by Justice Roberts, and the problems hereto-
fore discussed relate to what probably may be called the Simon-pure
doctrine of entrapment. While this somewhat narrow definition of the de-
fense is probably entirely accurate,43 the cases dealing with the doctrine
have labeled as "entrapment" a variety of pleas which are unrelated to
charges of enticement or procurement by officers of the law.44
It is generally recognized that a person, suspecting that a crime is
contemplated against his person or property may wait passively and
allow matters to go on, and even furnish the most complete opportunity
for its commission in order to apprehend the criminal.45 If, however, he
takes any affirmative action to aid or encourage the would-be criminal,
if his conduct is active rather than passive, it is said that the victim has
given his consent.46 The cases often state that the defense of entrapment
is available to the defendant. 47 Authorities have held that "entrapment"
is a defense where (1) action by an officer has eliminated a physical con-
dition which is an essential element of the crime charged,48 or (2) where
the victim in company with an officer, has consented to a crime to be
42 Contra, note, 16 Mo. L. REv. 165 (1933), in which it is suggested that such
action by officers should incriminate them to the extent of the person thus entrapped.
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 231 (9th ed. 1948) explains that the essential element
of dolus, or malicious determination to violate the law, is wanting in their cases
and thus the crime cannot be imputed to them.
See note, 2 So. CALIF. L. RFv. 283 (1929).
"Coe, The Doctrine of Entrapment, 23 OKLA. BAR JOURNAL 2275 (1952). The
author suggests that the term "entrapment" is a misnomer, for it is not the entrap-
ping of criminals which the law frowns on, but rather the seduction of the innocent
by its officers.
" State v. Hughes, 208 N. C. 542, 181 S. E. 737 (1935) ; State v. Salisbury Ice
Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737 (1914) ; People v. Smith, 25, Ill. 185, 95 N. E.
1041 (1911) ; 22 C. J. S. Criminal Law, § 42. (1940).
"State v. Adams, 115 N. C. 775, 20 S. E. 722 (1894). The victim, having
knowledge of an intended theft by defendant, allowed his servant to approach de-
fendant and advise defendant now was the time for the theft; State v. Goffney, 157
N. C. 624 73 S. E. 162 (1911) : State v. Nelson, 232 N. C. 602, 61 S. E. 2d 626
(1950) ; Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N. W. 1037 (1915).
"Cases cited notes 45 and 46 supra.
State v. Shouquette, 250 Okla. Cr. 169, 219 Pac. 727 (1923) ; E.g.: in burg-
lary when the breaking is done -by the officer, Love v. People, 160 Ili. 501, 43 N. E.
710 (1896).
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committed against his person or property, when lack of consent is an
essential element of the offense charged,49 and even where the conduct
of the victim, or his authorized agent, acting alone, can be said to amount
to a consent, and lack of consent is an essential of the offense."0 Logi-
cally, it seems these situations would require no affirmative plea of
entrapment, 5' since the essence of the defendant's contention is: "I did
not commit the substantive offense. The prosecution cannot satisfy all
the elements of the crime." Some writers have dogmatically asserted this
class of cases to be distinguishable from entrapment, and declare courts
which do not recognize this are confused.52  Other writers have at-
tempted to distinguish between consent which vitiates criminal liability
when lack of consent is an element and consent which constitutes the
defense of entrapment. 53 When it is realized, however, that consent
given only for purposes of trapping the criminal is, nevertheless, suffi-
cient consent to vitiate criminal liability,54 nice distinctions vanish. How-
ever, to state blandly that these cases in which the victim plans to trap
the criminal, raising the issue of the victim's consent, are unrelated to
entrapment is to ignore the cases. Rather, it seems that the "entrap-
ping" methods used by the victim serve to answer the question: was
consent given?
A recent North Carolina case, State v. Burnette 5 dealt with the
question of consent of the victim in entrapment pleas, and reviewed the
North Carolina cases. The defendant was convicted of an assault with
intent to commit rape. The evidence disclosed that the prosecutrix re-
ceived repeated calls from an unidentified man who threatened to satisfy
his passion on her person at all events. She reluctantly agreed to a
proposal by law enforcement officers to meet the defendant with officers
concealed in the back of her car. On the third attempt to keep a pre-
arranged rendezvous with the defendant, the prosecutrix admitted him
to her car in response to his request. When the defendant was admitted
to the car he "lunged" at the prosecutrix, who screamed, and the con-
cealed law enforcement officer arrested the defendant. The court held
"9 State v. Nelson, 232 N. C. 602, 61 S. E. 2d 626 (1950) ; Connor v. People, 18
Colo. 273, 33 Pac. 159, (1893) ; Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th cir.
1915).
" People v. Mills, 178 N. Y. 274, 70 N. E. 786 (1904).
"There is a conflict of authority as to whether the defense must be (1) intro-
duced under a plea of not guilty and determined as a question of fact by the jury,
or (2) is a matter for determination by the court at any time in whatever manner
the question may be raised. The first rule is based on the theory that defendant is
not guilty; the second rule is based on the theory that although defendant is guilty,
public policy requires his acquittal. Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir.
1921) ; United States v. Healey, 202 Fed. 349 (D. C. Mont. 1920).
"-' Anderson, op. cit. supra note 7.
' Heywood, op. cit. supra, note 36.
' State v. Goffney, 157 N. C. 624, 73 S. E. 162 (1911) ; State v. Adams, supra
note 45.
-242 N. C. 164, 85 S. E. 2d 744 (1955).
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that the prosecutrix did not consent to an assault, and that the defense
of entrapment need not have been submitted to the jury.
In a somewhat similar case, State v. Nelson,5" the court had reached
an opposite result. In that case, the prosecutrix received a call from
the defendant in response to an advertisement for work she had inserted
in the newspaper. Prosecutrix communicated with officers who advised
her to meet the defendant, promising to follow in another car. The
reasons for these precautions do not appear. At the meeting the defend-
ant proceeded to continually place his hand upon prosecutrix's leg, over
her protests, and was arrested by law officers when he stopped his car.
In reversing defendant's conviction of assault, the court stated that the
acts of the prosecutrix amounted to a consent to an assault for purposes
of prosecution.
In the Burnette case, the court distinguished this case by stating,57
"in the Nelson case there was no evidence that the prosecutrix knew
that a crime was contemplated against her person. . . ." At first blush,
it appears anomalous that one who knows of a contemplated crime
against her person, goes to meet the defendant and is held not to have
consented to the assault, whereas one who, has no reason to suspect an
assault, meets the defendant and is assaulted, is said to have consented to
the act. Moreover, since the offense in both cases involved assault in
which the appearance of consent is relevant in determining the defend-
ant's intent, it might be contended that there was more of an appearance
of consent when the prosecutrix made three efforts to meet the defendant
at an isolated place at night after being advised of defendant's purpose,
than in the Nelson case in which the prosecutrix met defendant in broad
daylight with the avowed puropse of discussing a job. In the Burnette
case there can be little doubt as to defendant's intent to commit rape, at
the time of the telephone call. Nevertheless, it seems that an objective
test of consent, viewing prosecutrix's acts as they must have looked to
the defendant, could raise doubts as to whether such intent existed at the
time of his meeting with prosecutrix.
Considered on an over-all basis, the fact situations in the two cases
seem to justify their results. Thus although the court speaks of entrap-
ment in a case in which the issue is consent of the victim, the distinction
drawn by the court serves to emphasize the nature of the consent test
and its relation to the defense of entrapment. The court looks to the
reasonableness and propriety of the victim's conduct in determining if
consent was given in a manner analogous to the true entrapment cases,
which inquire into the conduct of the officer in determining in whose
mind the offense originated. Thus in the Burnette case, the prosecutrix's
"o 232 N. C. 602, 61 S. E. 2d 626 (1950).
1'242 N. C. 164, 167, 87 S. E. 2d 191, 193 (1955).
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justification in wanting the defendant identified weighed heavily in the
court's determination of the consent issue, whereas in the Nelson case
the prosecutrix appeared to be a volunteer in the plan to apprehend the
defendant.
An unfortunate by-product of treating the issue of consent of the
victim as an entrapment defense is illustrated by the charge of the trial
judge in the Burnette case. The judge charged the jury, on the defense
of entrapment, in substance, that if the prosecutrix aided, encouraged or
consented to an assault upon her by defendant for the purpose of appre-
hending defendant in the commission of the assault, pursuant to an intent
not originating with defendant, defendant would not be guilty. The court
found the charge to be without error. This seems incorrect. While the
origin of the criminal intent in the mind of the victim should be decisive
of the issue of whether consent was given, the converse of that proposi-
tion is not necessarily true. As the court recognized in an earlier case,58
if the act of the victim amounts to a consent, it is immaterial whether
the criminal intent originated in the mind of the accused. . Other cases
have recognized this.59 Construing the charge as a whole, it does not
seem that the defendant was prejudiced; but the difficulty experienced
by the trial court from entwining two separate defenses seems inevitable
because of our Supreme Court's view of "entrapment" as involving im-
proper conduct of officers of the law and consent of the victim in offenses
in which lack of consent is an element.
In another recent case, State v. Jackson,0° the defendant, convicted
of uttering a worthless check in violation of GS 14-107, contended that
the payee, by trickery, persuasion and fraud had induced him to write
the check. The defendant contended that the payee promised not to
present the check for payment, and that his purpose was to prosecute
the defendant. The court rejected this defense, quoting from Polski v.
United States :"' "The very heart of the doctrine of entrapment is that
the government itself has brought about the crime."06 2 The court adopted
the federal view of entrapment in cases in which the offense charged is a
crime regardless of the consent of any one, stating that, since uttering
a worthless check is a crime regardles of the consent of anyone, the de-
fense of entrapment must be predicated upon acts of officers of the gov-
ernment. The court, however, perpetuated the entwining of separate
defenses by reiterating its statement in the Love case: "The Federal
conception of entrapment is not necessarily binding upon us, for the
" State v. Adams, supra note 46.
" Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. App. 156 (1921) ; Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244,
109 N. W. 1037 (1923).
-0243 N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1956).
o33 F. 2d 686 (8th Cir. 1929).
62243 N. C. 216, 219, 90 S. E. 2d 507, 509 (1956).
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question is much broader than the cited application in the Sorrells
case."
63
It seems desirable that the North Carolina court distinguish between
the doctrine of entrapment as defined in the federal courts, and the de-
fense of consent of the victim in prosecutions involving offenses to which
such consent is a defense. While the two defenses tend naturally to
overlap in factual settings, it should be remembered that they are en-
tirely distinct defenses: the one, admiting commission of the offense but
pleading entrapment by officers of the government, a plea whose founda-
tion is public policy; and the other, a plea of not guilty by virtue of the
fact that the conduct of the victim robbed the act of an essential element
of criminality.
JACK T. HAMILTON.
Eminent Domain-Just Compensation-Rydro-Electric Dam Sites
In the past when the government has taken private property for pub-
lic purposes or allowed one of its agencies to do so, the "just compensa-
tion" guaranteed to the private owner by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution1 has meant that the owner would receive the
full and perfect equivalent of the property in money or money's worth.2
Theoretically, the owner is to be put in as good a position pecuniarily
as he would have been had his property not been taken.3 In arriving at
this "equivalent" the courts have sought to determine the full and perfect
market value of the property at the time it was taken.4 This has involved
a consideration of the best and most profitable use to which the property
was adaptable and likely to be used in the reasonably near future,5 not
03 Ibid.
' U. S. CoxisT. amend. V, "... nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."
2 Olsen v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1946) ; Jacobs v. United States,
290 U. S. 13, 17 (1933) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S.
299, 304 (1923) ; North Carolina v. Sunrest Lumber Co., 199 N. C. 199, 154 S. E. 2d
123 (1930).
' Olson v. United States, supra note 2; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,
373 (1924) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, sipra note 2.
'United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 275 (1943) ; United
States v. Miller, supra note 3, at 374; Carolina & Yadkin R. R. v. Armfield, 167
N. C. 464, 83 S. E. 809 (1914) ; Creighton v. Water Commissioner, 143 N. C. 171,
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